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Subhash Kak 
 
Abstract: Although random sequences can be used to generate probability events, they come 
with the risk of cheating in an unsupervised situation. In such cases, the oblivious transfer 
protocol may be used and this paper presents a variation to the DH key-exchange to serve as 
this protocol. A method to verify the correctness of the procedure, without revealing the 
random numbers used by the two parties, is also proposed. 
 
1. Introduction 
The generation of events of specific probability is essential in many computations and in 
simulation of physical processes. Of particular interest is the generation of a random 
sequence that can simulate physical noise and be used for cryptographic and coding purposes. 
In a random binary (0,1) random sequence, where the bits are independent, the probability of 
each new bit being 0 (or 1) is ½.  
 
If two parties (Alice and Bob) wish to determine who should play first at a game, they might 
agree to let Alice play first if she calls the next bit (or the nth future bit) correctly. The 
problem with this method is that if the algorithm generating the random sequence is known 
to, say, Alice, she can run it in advance and, therefore, know the next bit in advance. To 
thwart such a possibility, one would need to place constraints on the nature of the random 
number generator such as designing it in such a way that it is impossible to emulate it. But 
that is not a realistic assumption if the generator is an algorithm that is implemented on a 
computer. If it is easy to generate a pseudo-random sequence, most likely it is 
cryptographically weak [1]-[7]. 
 
Alternatively, one could imagine that a trusted third party has a collection of random number 
generators. Alice now has to call the ith outcome of the kth random number generator 
correctly in order to win the call. If the number of generators is large and the number i is 
derived from some step in a computationally hard number-theoretic problem (such as the 
number of prime partitions of a large even number), it will become well-nigh impossible for 
cheating to occur. This is equivalent to the method of puzzles for security [8]. 
 
For those who seek mathematical elegance, one might appeal to quantum theory [9]. The 
outcome of a superposition quantum state, such as 10 ba   is random, with the probability 
of 0 and 1 being 
2
a and 
2
b , respectively. All one needs to do is to start with the state 
)10(
2
1
 , and measure it along the 0 and 1 bases, and the chosen outcome will have a 
probability of exactly ½.  An example of this are diagonally polarized photons that will be 
unpredictably received as horizontally or vertically polarized photons along these 
measurement bases. 
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This approach via physics is the perfect way to generate random events. But it is not easy to 
implement [10]-[12]. Due to the Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, one cannot generate 
single quantum states at specified time instants. Indeed, a low-power laser will generate 
photons with a Poisson distribution [13]. If there are multiple photons with diagonal 
polarization, the pattern of reduction to the bases states will make it difficult to fix event 
probabilities. The randomness of collapse is at the basis of quantum cryptography protocols 
[14],[15]. But due to the difficulty of generating single photon states, quantum cryptography 
itself uses classical random number generators to guide polarization rotations. 
 
Classical randomness is viewed as an aggregate of countless quantum processes. One could 
thus have a trusted party look at the thermal noise across a resister at specified future time (so 
that the bandwidth of the measurement apparatus can be discounted) and check if it is greater 
or less than the zero threshold. This can serve as an effective method of generating random 
events. But this requires a trusted third party to supervise the event generation process. 
 
The other method to use is the oblivious transfer (OT) protocol [16],[17] where two parties 
mutually arrive at the probability event. In the most basic form of OT, the sender sends a 
message to the receiver with probability ½, while remaining oblivious as to whether or not 
the receiver obtained the message. Other probabilities can also be likewise generated [18]. 
These schemes depend on one-way, number-theoretic functions that are at the basis of public 
key cryptography [19] and they require a choice out of two alternatives to be made at some 
point in the process.  
 
We assume that the two parties are authenticated to each other and the owner of the secret is 
honest (the recipient has no reason not being so). To ensure there is no cheating, one could 
speak in general either of post-communication audit, or supervision of the process by a 
trusted third party. The audit or verification process should not reveal the random numbers 
used by the two parties since that could compromise the random number generators used and 
weaken the security of the process. 
 
We mention parenthetically that randomness was an important notion in ancient societies. 
The gods were taken to act randomly in a fashion that could not be understood by reasoning. 
The idea of Vedic ritual [20], Dionysian mysteries, the ecstatic trance of the Oracle of Delphi 
[21],[22], or shamanic practices of other cultures [23] was to get into a state where one could 
somehow connect to the time of the gods. The oracle’s prophecy was worded ambiguously 
and what meaning it might convey could not be known to the oracle. 
 
Here we show that an adaptation of the DH key exchange protocol will serve as an OT 
protocol with verification. We show that the protocol allows Bob to guess Alice’s secret with 
the specified probability. Since the secret belongs to Alice, one can visualize a situation 
where she cheats so as to reduce Bob’s guessing probability. We address this possibility and 
show how there can be verification of the procedure. 
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2. The Protocol 
Alice and Bob together (or a trusted party) choose and publish a large prime p and two 
integers u1 and u2 of large order modulo p. It may thus be assumed that both parties know that 
u1 = k u2. 
 
Step 1. Alice chooses a random integer a, picks one of the two integers u1 and u2 and 
computes puA
a
i mod , where i = 1 or 2, and sends it to Bob. 
 
Step 2. Bob chooses a random integer b, picks one of the two integers u1 and u2 and 
computes puB
b
j mod , where j = 1 or 2, and sends it to Alice. 
 
Step 3. Alice takes the received number B and computes pBa mod pu
ab
j mod as 
the key to be used in encrypting a secret file to be sent to Bob. 
 
Step 4. Bob takes the received number A and computes pAb mod pu
ab
i mod as the 
key to be used in decrypting a secret file received from Alice. 
 
This protocol is shown in Figure 1 for the special case where Alice and Bob have chosen u1 
and u2, respectively. The other cases are where the choice is flipped or where both Alice and 
Bob choose the same basis. 
 
                     
            Figure 1. The proposed protocol where Alice and Bob choose different bases 
 
It is assumed that Alice will use the key pu
ab
mod2 to code her secret. She does not know 
whether Bob possesses this key or pu
ab
mod1 . The probability that they choose different 
bases is ½. Therefore, there is a 0.50 probability that the key generated by Alice and Bob is 
identical.  
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Figure 2. Bob gets the secret, S, if his key is the same as Alice’s 
 
If Bob fails to decrypt the secret with his key, he cannot use the knowledge that u1 = k u2, to 
determine the “correct” key. His incorrect key is related to the correct one through the 
relationship: 
 
ababab kuu 21  mod p        (1) 
 
Bob knows b, k, and pu
ab
mod1 , but that is not sufficient to obtain the correct key unless he 
can solve the discrete logarithm problem. 
 
The eavesdropper also cannot obtain any information about the final key from her 
observation of the data exchanged by Alice and Bob. 
 
Generalization. If in the protocol, there are m bases, u1, u2, …, um,  rather than just two, as in 
the example above, the probability that Bob will know the secret is 1/m. 
 
3. Possible cheating by Alice 
Alice can cheat by not sending pu
ab
mod2 to Bob over the public channel, but rather 
pu
fb
mod2 , using the exponent f to build this fake key. This cheating will be evident if both 
Alice and Bob choose the same basis, which will happen 50% of the time. The case of 
cheating thus corresponds to the use of different exponents by the two parties. 
 
To prevent cheating, we add the following steps to the protocol: 
 
Step 5. A random number r, publicly declared in advance, is used by Alice to generate 
v
n
 = pu
abr
j mod (n=abr). In the example of Figure 1,  puv
abrn mod2 . The number 
v
n
 is sent to Bob. 
 
Step 6 . Bob uses the verification sequence pwvnG nn mod)(  to establish that 
there has been no cheating. 
 
If v = w, G(n) =0. When v ≠ w, pnGnGnG mod)2()1()(   , where α and β are 
constants that are easily found. The verification sequence G(n) is described in the next 
section.  
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If Alice were to cheat by using pu
fb
mod2 as the key, but sends the correct pu
n
mod2 , she 
will be exposed in case Bob has chosen u2 and finds G(n) =0, while remaining unable to 
decrypt the secret. 
 
4. The verification sequence )(nG  
Consider the sequence pwvnG nn mod)(  . In general we can write 
  pvv kk
k mod   
pww kk
k mod          (2) 
 
Theorem 1. pknGknGnG kk mod)()1()(       (3) 
Proof. )(nG = pwv nn mod)(   
  = )( kknkkn wwvv     
  = )()( kk
kn
kk
kn wwvv      
= )()(
11 knkn
k
knkn
k wvwv
    
  = pknGknG kk mod)()1(    
 
When k = 2, 
 
 pnGnGnG mod)2()1()(        (4) 
 
which means that the sum of successive powers of v and w suffices to establish that they have 
been computed to the same exponent. All that is required to find the values of α and β is the 
solution to equation (2) for k = 2. No knowledge of the actual value of n is needed while 
computing equation (4). 
 
Example 1. Let k=2, v=3, and w=7 mod 19. To find α and β, we solve the equations: 
 
19mod3932    
19mod71172    
 
We find that α=10 and β=17. 
 
The series 19mod73)( nnnG  , for n = 0, 1, 2, 3,… is as follows: 
 
 
 2, 10, 1, 9, 12, 7, 8, … 
 
for which each nth element is 10 G(n-1)+13 G(n-2) mod 19. For example, the value 9 is 
10×1+17×10 mod 19. 
Example 2. Let k=2, v=3, and w=5 mod 17. To find α and β, we solve the equations: 
 
17mod3932    
17mod5852    
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We find that α=8 and β=2. 
 
The series 17mod53)( nnnG  , for n=0,1,2,3… is as follows: 
 
 2, 8, 0, 16, 9, 2, 0, 4, 15, 9, … 
 
for which each nth element is 8 G(n-1)+2 G(n-2) mod 17. 
 
Theorem 1 may be extended to modulo m, if u and v are relative prime to m. 
 
If the exponents in equation (2) are not the same then the result of Theorem 1 will not be 
valid. 
 
Since v and w are known, three consecutive G(n) values can be computed by successive 
multiplication with the appropriate bases and it checked if the successive numbers have the 
relationship of equation (3). 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper reviews the problem of generation of random events using classical and quantum 
techniques. It then presents a variation of the DH key exchange protocol to serve as an 
oblivious transfer protocol that can easily generate a probability event of 1/m, where m is 2 or 
higher integer. A verification procedure is presented that can catch attempts by Alice at 
cheating. 
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